

## CHAPTER 8

# “NAVIGATION TECHNIQUES”: HOW ORDINARY PARTICIPANTS ORIENT THEMSELVES IN SCRAMBLED INSTITUTIONS

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### ABSTRACT

*In organizations that have to meet demands from multiple sponsors, and that mix missions from different spheres, such as “civic,” “market,” “family,” how do participants orient themselves, so they can interact appropriately? Do participants’ practical navigation techniques have unintended consequences? To address these two questions, the authors draw on an ethnography of US youth programs whose sponsors required multiple, conflicting logics, speed, and precise documentation. The authors develop a concept, navigation techniques: participants’ shared unspoken methods of orienting themselves and appearing to meet demands from multiple logics, in institutionally complex projects that require frequent documentation. These techniques’ often have unintended consequences.*

**Keywords:** Institutional logics; non-profits; complexity; hybrid; audit; decoupling; institutional complexity; hybrid organizations; institutional logics; non-profit organizations; audit society; ethnography

### WHAT ARE WE DOING HERE?

Like many other businesses, government programs, non-profits, and voluntary associations these days, youth programs in Snowy Prairie had a wild, complicated

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mixture of sponsors with wildly varied, complicated missions: Missions included making participants into “empowered” *civic* volunteers; while lifting them out of poverty and toward success in the *market*; while treasuring each participant’s uniqueness and cultivating deep bonds in a *family*-like way; while connecting *diverse* people; and while respecting their hands-on, local, *community-based* knowledge. It all had to be documented and put on public display quickly and constantly, for sponsors, including government, private, and non-profit funders; parents and teachers; journalists; voters who might vote to fund to the youth programs; and others. The logics of government, civic association, market, family, diversity, community, and others crashed together. With their mix of sponsors, mixes of missions and need to do everything quickly and with constant documentation, these programs are examples of an increasingly common kind of collectivity in the world.

How do people figure out how to act appropriately in such scrambled institutions? When participants navigate so many competing explicit “logics” (Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012) or “justifications” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006), do these practices have unintended consequences? These are this chapter’s two questions. To provide a way of seeing how actors navigate this sea of logics, we develop the concept of *navigation techniques* and to show how to use this concept. When orienting themselves on this complicated landscape, participants had to acquire unspoken knowledge of a range of practices so they could take account of, and find their place in, this bewildering set of scrambled institutions. We define “navigation techniques” as:

ordinary actors’ continuous processes of orienting themselves in everyday interactions that involve institutional complexity and frequent documentation, in short-term relationships. These techniques help them figure out how to act appropriately: how (or if) to summon which logics for which audience!; who can do the summoning; and what cannot be said but must be acted on.

We show how six common navigation techniques worked. Our point is to show how to locate such techniques, and to show how they work, not to provide a list of all possible navigation techniques. We also show some unintended consequences of these techniques: fulfilling one or more of these projects’ many missions often meant undermining one or more of the project’s *other* missions. Some missions were more powerful than others: The combination of speed and publicity often undermined any missions that could be fulfilled only with a slower, quieter form of togetherness.

With their multiple missions from different institutions, speed and constant documentation, the youth programs are increasingly typical collectivities (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). Many civic engagement programs share similar tangles of crisscrossed logics (Berger, 2014; Berger, Cefai, & Gayet-Viaud, 2011; Bherer, Dufour, & Montambeault, 2016; Carrell, 2013; Clemens & Guthrie, 2011; Eliasoph, 2016; Krinsky & Simonet, 2017; Lee, McQuarrie, & Walker, 2015; Meilvang, Carlsen, & Blok, 2018; Montambeault, 2016). Similar tangles appear in “corporate social responsibility,” “social enterprise,” and “corporate volunteering” (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Besharov & Smith, 2013; Bromley & Powell, 2012; Shachar, Hustinx, Roza, & Meijs, 2018; Walker, 2014). Youth civic projects were often short-term, and the speed amplified the potential confusion

(Bechky, 2006; Girard & Stark, 2002; Kellogg, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2006). As in these other common kinds of organizations, youth programs' mixing and rapid switching was not an accident. "Flexibility" was a core mission. As one staff person told a youth civic engagement meeting, participation was "open and undefined, up to you to do 'whatever.'" On top of all these tangled logics and temporalities was a need to provide formal, often quantitative "audits" (Power, 1997) of the programs' impact, for multiple distant sponsors. In short, these programs represent a good case of a newly typical kind of collectivity. By highlighting navigation techniques, we show often overlooked "mechanisms" (Hedström & Swedberg, 1996) that allow people to orient themselves amidst all the many mismatched missions, temporalities, and needs for documentation. We are not looking for "laws," not hoping to reveal all possible navigation practices or all possible unintended consequences, but showing how other researchers can look for this "how."

Researchers have been calling for an examination of the "how," for more intensive questioning about how actors navigate such a complex institutional environment (e.g., Greenwood, Diaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010; Hallett, 2010), by focusing on actors' processes "mastering of contradictory or even paradoxical requirements ... [to] ... show and explain why these new organizational forms cannot be as flexible and fluid as promised after all" (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010, p. 1259). Looking for "navigation techniques" should help researchers document the firm, not entirely flexible and fluid, patterns.

As we discuss in depth below, studies of institutional logics often show how clever, creative leaders make use of such complexity, to steer an organization toward whatever mission they prefer. In contrast, we examine something more ordinary and widespread: how ordinary actors simply figure out where they are together, so they can find a footing on all the complexity, and feel as if they are acting appropriately for the context. Studies of institutional logics usually contrast with our agenda in another way: they usually show that an organization settles into one logic, or keeps incompatible logics separate, by conducting them in different times or place, for example. Eventually, the scrambled logics unscramble, in those studies, or they become a new, fairly coherent logic. The idea of navigation techniques, in contrast, highlights the possibility that scrambled missions do not unscramble, do not become coherent. Rather, people manage to keep going even when they intuit that they are misunderstanding each other. Even though youth program participants sometimes joked, backstage, about the mismatched logics and misunderstandings, they had to master these sturdy, repetitive interactional patterns for making the logics seem to work together well enough ... even when there were often grave unintended consequences, usually to the youth members themselves.

To trace these processes, we draw on one of the co-author's ethnographic study of a set of after-school programs and youth civic engagement projects in a Midwestern city in the US that we will call (pseudonymously, to preserve confidentiality) "Snowy Prairie." The study focuses on a set of afterschool programs for disadvantaged youth. As "prevention programs" for "at-risk youth," they were supposed to lower drop-out rates and prevent ills like drug abuse and

teen pregnancy. Adult volunteers came to these programs, usually staying only for a month or two, for an hour or two a week, hoping to help, and to develop an intimate bond with a disadvantaged youth. On some evenings and weekends, paid staff accompanied afterschool program participants to civic engagement projects, where the youth were supposed to plan and conduct volunteer activities. These civic projects were supposed to connect diverse people, so in them, the disadvantaged youth worked side-by-side with middle-class youth.

Below we first review relevant literature, identifying two broad streams of research on which we will build: the “institutional logics” perspective, and various “practices” approaches. We then describe our methodology and describe six common navigation techniques that we observed.

## INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS

Institutional logics are “socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804) that originate in different institutions, such as the market, bureaucracy, family, state, or religion (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). Thornton et al. (2012) list seven such logics: family, community, religion, state, market, profession, and the corporation. The authors note that logics have an important effect on action, even though they never actually appear in pure form in real life, but are “ideal types.” “The market,” for example, never appears without help from “the state” that upholds laws and creates money, or without “community” to create trust, and the need to uphold a reputation. These prevent buyers and sellers from being too tempted to cheat (Polanyi, 1944; Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006; Smith, 1776; Somers & Block, 2005). Because any one logic inevitably functions only by making use of the others hidden inside it, getting anything done requires “decoupling” practical action from the organization’s stated missions and structures. So, decoupling is necessary, even in seemingly coherent organizations that claim simply to be doing “market,” or “bureaucracy”: Actors tell the official story while doing other things.

In organizations that intentionally blend many logics, as our youth programs did, decoupling gets more complicated. The wider variety of logics can be like a “cultural toolkit” (Swidler, 1986) from which people creatively or strategically select tools, to advance their own agenda (e.g., Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Binder, 2007; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008; Edelman, 1992; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Heimer, 1999; Jay, 2013; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2013; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Schaefer, 2019; Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011; Westphal & Zajac, 1994). For example, in a non-profit housing organization, some creative actors use a market logic focusing on costs and accounting, while others use a different logic, focusing on helping the poor (Binder, 2007).

The institutional logics perspective shapes our thinking, but our empirical objects and theoretical questions demand going further. First, the “logics” approach usually focuses on creative leaders who try to bend the logics to meet

a hoped-for agenda, so it says little about how ordinary members, who are not leaders and not creatively trying to make changes, navigate complexity (e.g., Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013), not manipulating clashing logics, but just making sense of them.

Second, we treat the ideal-type “logics” as heuristic devices that we need to tailor to our empirical objects. Thornton et al list six logics (Thornton et al., 2012), Other scholars divide the spheres differently from Thornton et al.; Weber, Walzer, Alford and Friedland; and Stone list three (but not all the same three) (Alford & Friedland, 1985; Stone, 2001; Walzer, 1984; Weber, 1978), Boltanski and Thévenot’s “orders of worth” approach lists six (but a different six from Thornton et al.’s 2006) (like Thornton et al., Boltanski and Thévenot examine public justifications in relation to interaction, so, while their work differs in many ways, their focus on the question of how publicly stated missions relate to ordinary interaction is similar). We do not reify any one approach’s list, but select from them, and expand them, as needed. We also needed to add a public justification and mission that was overwhelmingly important in our case: “the connectionist” justification (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007) in which the ideal is to bring diverse people together across the widest possible social divisions.

Third, this research focuses on relatively bounded organizations, but as many researchers note, temporary, flexible coordination in seemingly “boundaryless” (e.g., Ashkenas, Ulrich, Jick, & Kerr, 2002), “chronically unfrozen” (Weick, 1979) collectivities are becoming more common (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010). Rather than calling them organizations, we could call them “projects” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007), or, following actors’ themselves, “programs.” But these terms are not important. What matters is that in this somewhat boundaryless sea of unfrozen collectivities, it is not even clear that the organization should be the unit of analysis.

Fourth, most “logics” research expects, and finds, discordant logics resolving, when either one logic eventually becomes dominant over others, or when previously discordant logics eventually harmonize. Many studies show long-term transformation. But in the short-term, which may last forever, even when actors do not *harmonize* different logics, they can still “muddle through” (Lindblom, 1977). It is this muddling that we want to understand.

#### *Approaches That Focus on Everyday, Unspoken “Practices”*

A second research stream heeds the many calls in organization theory to make its interactional foundations more explicit (e.g., Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013; Thornton et al., 2012; Zucker, 1977). It examines ordinary actors’ activities, in organizations that have varied audiences and logics, in which actors have difficulty discerning any solid roles or rules (Bechky, 2006; Besharov & Smith, 2013; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Heimer & Staffen, 1998; Smets, Jarzabkowski, Burke, & Spee, 2014). For example, examining the ways that different ordinary actors navigate different “logics,” even within one physical space, and even within one interaction, Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013) show how German and British lawyers working together learn, over time, how to

recognize and bridge the two nations' contrasting background assumptions about how law works and what lawyers are supposed to do. Studying a hospital over time, Currie and Spyridonidis (2019) show how nurses' and doctors' respective logics transform in relation to each other, over time, through small mutual adjustments in their everyday interaction.

Such research starts, as we do, with the idea that actors are usually unaware of their know-how. As Bourdieu puts it, they know more than they know they know, using practical knowledge that they can rarely verbalize at the moment of action, or even upon reflection (e.g., Bourdieu, 1992; Garfinkel, 1967; Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014; Schutz, 1962). Sometimes, the most important practices are those that actors not only do not, but *cannot* verbalize (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). As Bechky notes (2006), practical interaction patterns, themselves, *become* an important part of the, "order," regardless of official rules, or even when the organization overtly has little or no structure, logics, and roles.

This "interaction order" (Goffman, 1982) is, itself, the social glue, regardless of the overt "content" of communication. If you want to know how a bureaucracy or a civic association really works, you have to examine the interaction order (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003; Lipsky, 2010). Like Bechky (2006) and Kellogg et al. (2006), we examine ordinary actors, who are simply trying to orient themselves in bewildering landscapes. Like them, we document participants' interactions with each other, in ordinary situations, rather than in interviews or on-site conversations with the researcher.

Bringing this interactional approach and the institutional logics approaches together, Smets, Aristidou, and Whittington (2017) call for "practice-driven institutionalism." Yes, logics are ideal types that never appear in pure form in real life, and yes, there is always "decoupling." Still, even if the ideal type never appears full-blown in everyday life, and even though decoupling is always necessary, the official logics nonetheless, somehow, have *some* effects on action. We show how demands from the environment can shape members' internal interaction order.

## METHODS

We re-analyze data from the first author's ethnography of after-school and summer programs, youth civic engagement projects, and the adult staff of these programs (Eliasoph, 2011). In such complex settings, even deciding what to count as "internal" versus "external" poses a puzzle; even neutrally describing the web of projects, programs and networks is not just an empirical puzzle, but a theoretical one.

Participants of the *afterschool and summer programs* that met every weekday included: disadvantaged youth of color; paid staff; and short-term adult volunteers. To appeal to funders, these were displayed as "prevention programs" for "at-risk youth." As will soon become clear, navigation techniques made use of racial distinctions, so we specify: They were nearly all youth-of-color.

The *civic engagement projects* met monthly, with frequent additional subcommittee meetings and projects. Disadvantaged youth would come to these as a group, from their afterschool programs. Often overhearing staff describing them

as “at-risk,” disadvantaged youth assumed that “prevention” was an important justification for their involvement. As one boy put it when a reporter asked him about his volunteer work, “I’m involved instead of being out on the streets or instead of taking drugs or doing something illegal.”

Disadvantaged youth volunteers came to the civic projects where they were supposed to participate on equal footing with youth whom we awkwardly call “non-disadvantaged youth.”<sup>2</sup> These middle-class youth came as individuals, driving their own cars or being driven by their parents. Not needing to appeal to funders, they participated under a different logic from the disadvantaged youth, often focusing on how their volunteer hours would appear on college applications. They all appeared white (except one Asian American teen, in the researcher’s four and a half years on site).

The two set of youth volunteers worked together planning and conducting events and projects like gathering food for the homeless, organizing the city-wide celebration of Martin Luther King Day, decorating the Pediatric Hospital for winter holidays, conducting a blood drive, having parties for themselves, and giving testimony at City Hall about the importance of funding youth programs.

All these projects were part of the *Network of Youth Organizations*, the *NOYO*, an astonishingly diverse set of youth organizations, ranging from Girl Scouts, arts non-profits, churches, jobs programs for high school drop-outs, to programs for future farmers in rural villages, to city youth agencies. These programs and others sent representatives to the *NOYO*’s monthly meetings, frequent subcommittee meetings, and classes for youth workers. Some, though not all, members had *political* mission, hoping, as one said, when discussing youth volunteering at a food pantry, “the key to it all is to ask, ‘why there is hunger and what can our society do about it?’”

In sum, four main types of individuals participated in these organizations: paid staff of programs in the *NOYO*, adult volunteers in the afterschool programs, disadvantaged youth, and “non-disadvantaged youth.” But consider the boundaries between these categories to be, themselves, part of the epistemological puzzle: Actors flowed from one project to another, in various combinations, when, for example, a staff person who led an afterschool program would volunteer at night for the civic engagement project. Was it part of her job or was she a volunteer? It depended on how broadly she understood her job and on whether she could bear to work 80 hours a week that week (as many of them did). Similarly, distinguishing between the internal and external complexity poses a problem. For example, external sponsors demanded that the civic engagement projects involved racially diverse youth who would not otherwise have met. There was no “internal” that existed before the external sponsors’ demands.

In addition to doing ethnography, we collected whatever print data was circulated among participants, such as meeting minutes, posters, internal memos, grant application forms, and newspaper coverage.

We analyzed our data by fitting our research questions and our empirical data together, over time, step by step (Gehman et al., 2018). We first wrote a theory-driven proposal that asked questions about adult-led youth civic engagement. We dipped our toes in the field, examined what we found in light of our theories, and started

grouping our finding into initial categories that were relevant to our research question and the theoretical framework on which we had drawn (Burawoy, 1998; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). We organized, and reorganized, the data into themes and then tried to group those themes into more general themes (Van Maanen, 1979); doing ethnography is not a linear or one-time process, so we did this many times. Each time, when what we found in the field contradicted or would have been ignored by our themes, or by our favored theories (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 1999) we then both revised our themes and went back to the books, to find specifically what the original themes and theories had missed and why, searched for more possibly relevant theories, revised our initial themes, and then went back into the field to check if they helped make more sense of what we were observing (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). We paid special attention to moments that evoked strong emotion or puzzlement in the researcher and/or participants. To reprise Katz's metaphor (2001), in moments of laughter, anger, awe, bafflement, confusion, and other high emotion, the seemingly smooth fabric of reality rips apart, and we can see its threads.

One example illustrates one of those “aha” moments that ripped reality's curtain: at a summer meeting planning youth civic projects for the fall, participants in a NOYO subcommittee laughed at how complicated it was to get the timing right. Planning an event required juggling multiple audiences' calendars: “showcasing youth leadership” in time to influence November elections; but not too long before government agencies assessed grant applications; but not too long before county officials drew up the annual budget; but long enough after kids came back to school so that they would have a week to help plan and “take ownership” of the event, as if they had thought it up themselves. The event had to take be visible, public and fun, to persuade all these audiences, and others (parents, voters, teachers, kids). Since promoting “youth leadership” was an important mission, youth had to appear to have created the events themselves. A young staff person who worked closely with teens expressed concern about planning anything before any teens got there. Indeed, in all this, the only thing lost was the mission that staff held dearest to heart: the possibility of youth “leaders” creatively and thoughtfully initiating something civic.

Chasing down clues like this led the researcher down the path of theorizing the complex environment's effects on internal interaction.

## **NAVIGATION TECHNIQUES IN THE YOUTH PROGRAMS' COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS**

We now describe the six of the navigation techniques we observed. For each, we ask, “How did it work as a response to institutional complexity?” And “With what effects and unintended consequences?” First, actors often enthusiastically conducted activities that sponsors required, but that ended up undermining the organization's main missions. We call this *enthusiastic “means-ends” decoupling* (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Second, actors had to mobilize knowledge that was taboo to make explicit, *disavowing but using unspoken knowledge*. For example, as we will see, they had to know which volunteers were coming from their afterschool



“prevention” programs for disadvantaged youth, and which were coming to fluff up their CVs for future college applications. To make their guesses, participants used visible racial cues. Without access to this disavowed knowledge, they could not make sense of the different measures of success that staff and funders had for different participants. Third, actors spoke *using floating signifiers* like “community,” so that multiple audiences could see what looked like harmony, without anyone’s having to communicate any content. Fourth, *using small-talk as a simulacrum of intimacy* gave friendly chatter an emotional charge that would make no sense in other situations. Fifth, actors *separated front-stage and backstage*, moving *backstage* to protect the organization’s most core missions, when these missions were too hard to display and measure for the projects’ many audiences. Sixth, *speaking in the future perfect* let actors talk about hoped-for future potential outcomes *as if they have already occurred*. The “future perfect” is a verb tense, of course (abstract example: “You will have finished dinner by the time you get dessert.”). [Table 1](#) summarizes these techniques.

### ENTHUSIASTIC MEANS-ENDS DECOUPLING

In means-ends decoupling, actors “rigorously pursue many activities that have unknown effects and relationships to core goals” ([Bromley & Powell, 2012](#), p. 21). To keep their organization afloat, they have to document successes in sponsors’ stated missions, like promoting diversity and civic engagement. But they spend so much time and energy on the audit, they have almost none left to *do* the activities that the audit is supposed to measure. Means and ends disconnect in another way when needed resources like food and safe conditions are not included in most sponsors’ official mission statement. They are not special enough, not innovative or exciting enough, to require an explicit mission. When something is not measured, it might disappear, putting participants at risk of lacking basic needs. As [Bromley and Powell observe \(2012\)](#), means-ends decoupling is part of the expanding “audit culture” ([Power, 1997](#); [Strathern, 2000](#)) that requires constant scrutiny from, and documentation to, external audiences. The auditors infiltrate the project’s interior more than they did back when there were fewer demands for audits.

One typical meeting of a youth civic engagement project illustrates means-ends decoupling. The plan had been for youth volunteers to have an open-ended brainstorm. It ended up being devoted almost entirely to the forms that kids had to fill out documenting participation in the “President’s 100 Hour Challenge,” a national award for youth who complete 100 hours of volunteer work.

A staff person asked, “Would you remember to send it in?”

Some of the eight teens in the meeting answered: “No.”

Other adults chimed in: “What if you got a reminder? What if you forgot to sign the form? Who’ll pay for copying and postage? Would it just be an extra burden, after having already done the volunteer work, to have to fill out a form? What if you couldn’t find them? How can we distribute them to you? ... What if some of your hours didn’t get recorded? What if you forgot to send in the sheets? Should there be an event mid-year, to give recognition to youth who’ve performed 50 hours of service? 30 hours? 20 hours? Who will record this data?”

**Table 1.** Navigation Techniques and Their Unintended Consequences.

Navigation Technique	Definition	Intended and Unintended Consequences
Enthusiastic ends-means decoupling	Enthusiastically discussing both how to fulfill external audience's official demands, and how to document success in meeting those demands.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Forces participants to spend more time, thought, and energy on documenting action than on enacting the organization's core mission(s).</li> <li>2. Puts recipients at constant risk of having basic needs unmet, since documentation has to address funders' explicit ideas.               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Can bring diverse, unequal participants together quickly and without overt conflict.</li> <li>2. Can solidify and intensify the disavowed knowledge. It is a needed, durable, repeated basis of action, constantly being put to use. But since it cannot be discussed, it cannot be questioned.</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. Can silence disadvantaged participants, so the potentially troubling but liberating discussions that some staff wanted to air could only happen backstage, in segregated, non-diverse clusters.</li> <li>4. Can succeed in displaying the "connectionist, diversity" logic in public, usually by undermining it in practice.               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Can allow short-term, plug-in volunteers to come and go at will, and to feel authentic intimacy quickly.</li> <li>2. Can undermine the intimate relationships that long-term participants create with each other.</li> <li>3. Can silence disadvantaged participants if their small talk would involve talking serious about, or even joking about, social troubles.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
Disavowing but mobilizing taboo background knowledge	Relying on implicit knowledge that violates the organization's explicit missions (e.g., about participants' social inequality) but that must be known in order to make sense of interaction. Trying to ignore inequality but needing knowledge of it in order to make sense of interaction.	
Enthusiastic small-talk as a simulacrum of authentic intimacy	Treating small talk with acquaintances whom one expects never to see again, or expect to see only for a short time, as if it were a symbol of an authentic personal bond, or as if it were heading inexorably toward such intimacy. Expecting this instant intimacy to lead to a personal transformation.	

Using floating signifiers	Using big, vague, important, magical keywords (e.g., “community, choice, responsibility, diversity, culture”) that have different meanings for different audience members, so that multiple audiences can act as if they are in agreement, without anyone’s having to communicate any content.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Can make concrete action hard, since the referent is so abstract.</li> <li>2. Can confuse participants when different audiences have mismatched or opposite understandings of the word’s meaning in the context.</li> <li>3. Can make inequality hard to recognize, by allowing some audiences to “hear” terms like diversity and community as being about “inequality,” while other audiences hear them as being about “unity.” This can mean ignoring the “diversity” that staff are so eager to bridge, whenever “diversity” includes “unjust inequality.”</li> </ol>
Separating frontstage and backstage	Protecting some of the organization’s core missions by moving the activities that address them “backstage,” momentarily allowing participants to focus on quiet, slow, real change instead of only on attractive public displays. These activities move backstage either: when public exposure would destroy them because they are intimate, or when they are too hard to display and document quickly, for the projects’ many audiences.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Can make the it hard for projects to communicate their civic lessons to the greater public. Projects appear to be displaying their real work in the public glare, when in fact, the real work has to be hidden, because it is hard to explain quickly, and their subtle results come too slowly.</li> <li>2. Can encourage cynicism among members about the stated missions of organizations.</li> <li>3. Can make it hard to talk about unjust inequality, since that discussion takes too long.</li> </ol>
Using the future perfect	Describing a hoped-for future as if it had already arrived; making the leader’s planning as invisible as possible so the participant can shine.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Can work when it includes shared practical action, in a long-term relationship, over months or years.</li> <li>2. Can be confusing when participants mistake the hoped-for reality for the current reality.</li> </ol>

Teens got volunteer-hours credit for attending meetings, for discussing how to count volunteer hours, and for filling out the forms documenting their hours. If the work was unpleasant, each hour counted double. They discussed whether they could count each hour toward two different awards programs that both count volunteer hours. And all those discussions about accounting counted as community service. Data sheets were eventually created, to record the numbers. They left space for narrative reflections, but almost no teens filled out that section, and no one read them except the researcher (who entered the numerical data into a non-profit's database), and a staff person who needed to find "pull quotes" for a grant proposal.

This kind of decoupling worked when it becomes an engrossing game. Absorbed, members could get along, and the documentation could appease multiple external constituents. Even if it did not fascinate everyone, everyone had to display great enthusiasm about the game, and not talk about how far it caused the organization to stray from its stated missions.

The pressure to document also meant that organizers had to steer volunteers toward activities that would be easy to quantify: pounds of food delivered, pounds of trash collected, hours spent volunteering, or number of volunteers involved. Measuring the food drive's success by the pound meant that it was more valuable to gather heavy items like bottled water or sacks of sugar, than expensive, light things like shampoo and Tampax. We never learned if the recipients would have places to cook or store food.

One of these projects' missions was to help volunteers become more understanding, empathic civic actors, by walking in the shoes of the other. Some staff were also on a mission to encourage volunteers to ask political questions, like "Why is there homelessness in this country?" as one adult put it. Gathering food by the pound had no relationship to staff's most cherished missions.

Means-ends decoupling had another unintended consequence: whatever could not easily be measured for any audience might not happen at all. It was hard to find funds to meet basic necessities. Donors' spelled out lofty missions like promoting civic engagement, lifting people out of poverty, or connecting diverse people. Donors were not excited about basic needs.

Hungry afterschool participants would buy junk food from expensive vending machines, or, in one lucky program, devour city-funded bags of cookies or chips. In a long volley, staff pitched in ideas for how to justify food, when writing grant applications: it lowers risk of diabetes, lowers weight, attracts volunteers, raises math scores, boosts girls' self-esteem, and displays love and a family-like atmosphere. They had to justify a basic need by repackaging it as possibly addressing funders' explicit, fashionable missions. Attracting funding to repair one program's leaky roof and dangerous playground equipment was even harder; both took years.

This is not to say that staff believed that the audits realistically reflected effects. Discussing the grant they were writing to get money for weekly Pizza Nights, one joked, imagining a "post-test" question, "Because you ate pizza and got to socialize on Friday night, do you feel better about yourself?" The effect is more intangible."

To summarize, enthusiastic means-ends decoupling worked as a navigation technique, addressing complexity by documenting success in fulfilling audiences' explicitly stated missions. It worked well when members treated the activity of documenting, itself, as an absorbing game.

What were the unintended consequences? First, discussions of how to document the volunteer work took time away from "civic" conversation; took more time than the volunteering itself. Second, the external supporters who required systematic, quantitative, frequent documentation had the firmest, clearest, most time-consuming demands. Satisfying them forced adults to steer youth toward easy-to-document activities and away from whatever activities might be too subtle to document or have long-term effects that would be hard to measure within the short period of the grant. Third, since supplying necessities rarely was an exciting, sexy, explicit mission for funders, programs constantly risked just not getting basic needs met.

### **DISAVOWING BUT MOBILIZING TABOO BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE**

Disavowing but mobilizing taboo knowledge was necessary when the only way that participants could know what was expected of whom was to draw on knowledge that conflicted with the projects' missions. For example, funders demanded that these projects bring racially diverse youth together; paid staff loved this "connectionist" mission, but it posed interactional puzzles. It may look, in the following examples, as if white staff people were just afraid of discussing racism, racial inequality, or even race,, for reasons that went beyond the youth projects. But not all staff were white, and there were organizational reasons to avoid the topic, that would bind any staff, regardless of their own personal fears.

On the one hand, if you looked African American, Latino, or Asian, other members used visual cues to assume that you were in a prevention program for at-risk youth (and as mentioned earlier, this assumption would have been correct except for one youth leader who was Asian American). While participants relied on this unspoken knowledge, they could not make this intuition explicit. It was not egalitarian enough, not "civic."

On the other hand, demonstrating racial diversity to funders had to mean noticing race. Promoting "diversity" meant that there had to be something significant about the "diverse" members' differences. That is, no one bothers to promote diversity between saxophonists and drummers, or dog lovers and cat lovers, because no injustice created those differences. Diversity, according to youth-of-color, was not just about racial *difference*, but *racism*. By not talking about racism, visibly diverse people could easily be physically co-present, thus upholding one part of the connectionist logic.

When staff feared talking about racism, their reasons probably transcended the immediate organizations. But whatever the broader society-wide forces may be, their navigation techniques clearly addressed more proximate forces: collisions between the youth programs' external audiences' demands. To satisfy their many

audiences, they had to attract large *numbers* of youth who might not want to sit still for long, tempestuous discussions, and if they did not have fun, they might drop-out (within the first 20 minutes of one meeting, the staff leader used the word “fun” over 18 times). Projects had to attract socially *diverse* youth whose discussions could easily become flammable. They had to conduct splashy, alluring public activities that would make audiences want to support and fund the programs; any discussion explosive issues would take time away from publicity.

A more racially diverse staff might have navigated this puzzle differently, but they would have had to satisfy the many audiences’ demands. With subtle training and time for planning, perhaps staff could have planned fun activities addressing unjust, long-standing inequalities between participants, but that much time and training were not available here.

Without using racial cues, participants could not decipher each other’s actions or the different treatment given to different youth. For example, everyone had to learn that that an important mission justifying disadvantaged youth’s civic engagement was to prevent them from “becoming statistics,” as they themselves sometimes put it. They often overheard public speech that advertised their programs’ success in preventing them from *being* problems. The non-disadvantaged youth, in contrast, assumed that the purpose of *their* volunteering was to solve *other people’s* problems. This difference caused discord that fell along racial lines. When, for example, a (white) staff person suggested that the teens give themselves a party with the money that the county had allocated for their civic engagement project, the non-disadvantaged teens balked, saying that they were supposed to be helping other people, not themselves. But for the youth of color, just being present was supposed to be enough, since part of the mission for their part of the project was to be a prevention program for disadvantaged youth. Staff made it clear that for them, just showing up was good enough. After one disadvantaged teen had sat silently in meetings for six months, for example, a tactful staff person exclaimed triumphantly to other staff, after the meeting, that this girl had finally spoken! Everyone was delighted. It was a triumph because civic engagement project staff members sometimes said to the others that they should “face it,” that many disadvantaged teens were involved in the civic projects to avoid having to go to empty or abusive homes, not because they cared about civic engagement.

Using visual cues advertised “diversity” while possibly reinforcing racial stereotyping. A dark face cued members into which logic to apply. For example, an experienced staff person was encouraging teens to attend a City Council meeting to defend youth programs’ budgets. But only white boys, and the one Asian American non-disadvantaged volunteer, offered to speak. After a long pause, the staff person rephrased his request. This time, he asked for volunteers who would be willing to stand at the podium while someone *else* spoke. Many diverse teens’ hands shot up; the staff person beamed. This was a clever solution, for using visual cues to quickly show to audiences that the program was fulfilling government funders’ missions, of promoting diversity and preventing crime, drug abuse, and other statistically likely outcomes for youth of color. The presence of “diverse” faces addressed the problem by treating the kids as representatives of categories without having to say anything about race. However, doing so undermined the

core mission of promoting civic equality: it reinforced the practice of using visual cues, whereas staff dearly wanted to teach kids to avoid racial stereotyping.

African American teens complained, backstage, to each other (or sometimes, to the researcher after about three years of familiarity) about these constant disavowals. For example, they had an ongoing joke about one of their schoolteachers, who strenuously claimed to be “not racist,” and one teen drew a graphic on the chalkboard, saying their next project should be called “I (heart) Racism,” to mock white ladies like her.

As an unintended consequence of this navigation technique, it became hard to uphold another one of the project’s core missions: promoting “civic” equality among volunteers. They treated each other as un-equals, but they could not say why, so they could not critique the system that creates and maintains racial inequality.

Bringing people physically together but not talking about the racial divisions had another unintended consequence: the two sets of youth volunteers would be in the same physical space, but on opposite ends of it: different tables at an event, different corners of the room at a party. Visually, the patchwork pattern was striking, thus inadvertently reinforcing the color-based divisions that the programs dearly hoped to bridge. The hope was that just spending time in the same place would eventually lead to interracial understanding, but to do that, volunteers would have had to interact.

Meanwhile, the non-disadvantaged teens shared another bit of disavowed knowledge: they suspected themselves and others of participating only for the purpose of pumping up their resumes, since admission into good universities requires evidence of good citizenship. They would grow furious at other non-disadvantaged volunteer for not “pulling their weight” with volunteer projects. They knew not to have such wrath for disadvantaged participants.

To figure out why different teens were subject to different expectations, youth volunteers had to repress knowledge of their orienting techniques. This is quite different from situations that others have examined, in which differences are easier to navigate because they are easy to acknowledge, such as national (Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013) or professional differences (Currie & Spyridonidis, 2019; Heimer, 1999; McPherson & Sauder, 2013). Here, the puzzle was to use knowledge of the difference without naming it.

To summarize, “disavowing but mobilizing taboo background knowledge” worked as a navigation technique, addressing complexity by satisfying external audiences’ demands to bring diverse people together quickly and without overt conflict. It did so without having to talk about racism, and without having to specify which kinds of differences were most troubling, unjust and in need of spanning.

What were its unintended consequences? The potentially troubling but liberating discussions that some staff so dearly wanted to air could only happen backstage, either in clusters of disadvantaged teens and a long-term adult staff person, or in clusters of non-disadvantaged teens, but never (at least in the researcher’s four and a half years on site) in mixed groups. In fact, it could solidify and intensify the disavowed knowledge, since people routinely had to develop the

knowledge, for use-in-practice, but could not discuss it. They routinely saw it and act on it, but could not question it. So, the projects succeeded in *displaying* the “connectionist, diversity” logic in public, by undermining it in practice.

### ENTHUSIASTIC SMALL-TALK AS A SIMULACRUM OF INTIMACY

Enthusiastically engaging in impersonal small talk as if it were on the road toward a special, deep bond was a way of showing programs’ success in promoting family-like relationships, even when participants knew they were not likely to see one another again. In this case, small talk had to portend true connection. It had to appear to be speeding inexorably toward intimacy. It became a “simulacrum” – a representation for which there was no original – of intimacy.

The function of small talk has been observed since Bronislaw Malinowski described “phatic talk” in the 1920s (Malinowski, 1923). Neighbors say “Nice day out,” without hoping to do more than signal friendliness. Neighbors can go for decades going no further than commenting on the weather; there is no pressure to speed toward intimacy.

In contrast, when youth volunteers decorated the Pediatric Hospital for winter, an intense conversation revolved around whether they preferred mylar or plastic balloons. This conversation was one of highlights of the visit: a bond had been created. In a “bonding” exercise in a course for youth workers, staff from NOYO organizations broke out into small groups to talk about their “family cultures,” and then reunited as a class to describe the discussions. One breakout group included an older black man who ran a program for youth offenders, a white woman who grew up on a farm, and others. Their enthusiastic discussion was about how much they all loved birthdays when they were children. A participant excitedly exclaimed that another breakout group had bonded so well, it was a “lovefest.” His group’s lovefest was about how much they loved Christmas when they were children.

The thrill was more over the very fact that in these interracial, inter-class subgroups, communication had occurred. Regardless of content, the fact that interaction happened at all, between such diverse individuals, was supposed to auger future intimacy. Of course, small talk can lead to intimacy, if people meet again. However, in the youth projects, this simulacrum of small talk happened between people who did not expect to meet again. An unintended consequence was that youth learned how to make intense small talk with strangers – a useful lesson, but not what the programs had aimed to teach.

A more troubling unintended consequence arose when enthusiastic small talk not only served as a simulacrum of intimacy, but obstructed real dialogue. Later in the semester in that class for youth workers, the breakout group discussion topic was why “diversity” is so important in youth work. The same older black man questioned the premise, explaining to white participants that some black kids were not interested in “diversity.” Saying that they had good reason to fear white people, he described his own childhood, living in realistic fear of



lynchings and police violence. The white listeners in his subgroup enthusiastically nodded along, exclaiming, “Yes! It’s so important to get out of your box!” and then giving examples of how good it was that they themselves left their stifling home towns. This seemed, to the researcher, to be a misunderstanding. Their eagerness to sound quickly elated about trading intimacies became, itself, an obstacle to communication. So disadvantaged people could rarely talk about whatever it was that made their lives “diverse,” though spanning diversity was a core mission.

Small talk made establishing family-like familiarity hard, too, since it often meant ignoring participants’ real family experiences. When teens in one after-school program were chatting about friends and relatives (one was suspended from school, another was arrested while on probation; another was in prison; etc.), Kristin, a white, middle-class organizer, interrupted with a smile, “Come on, guys, let’s talk about something a little more positive now!!” So they stopped talking about their lives. Kristin worked in the youth programs for only a few months.

In contrast, some long-term staff did, indeed, develop a “family-like” relationship with disadvantaged youth. They did not need small talk to bear so much moral weight. When white staff stayed on site for years, they learned, for example, learning first hand, in repeated experiences, that “shopping while black” meant being trailed by the security guard from the moment of entering a store. Long-term staff had inside jokes with their kids, nagged them, got frustrated with them, very slowly taught them lessons, and learned lessons from them, over the course of years together. They did not need to use small talk as a simulacrum of intimacy.

Meanwhile, some short-term volunteers and short-term staff would try bonding with kids by making jokes about the laws they had broken, dope they had smoked, and other irreverent activities they bragged about, hoping to attract teens. Thus, there was another unintended consequence of short-term volunteers’ small talk with kids whom they did not expect to meet again: their chatter tended to undermine whatever intimacy the long-term staff managed to create in their afterschool programs.

To summarize: How did using small talk as a simulacrum of intimacy work as a navigation technique? Knowing how and when to use small talk allowed members to keep interactions going, across lines of vast social inequality and diversity.

What were the unintended consequences? Disadvantaged people were, again, often silenced, when their small talk was not “small” enough. Second, putting so much weight on small talk tended left little room for the ordinary, less freighted real small talk that could actually lead, eventually, to friendship or intimacy. People were so eager to bond quickly, they often didn’t listen to each other. Third, treating small talk as a harbinger of future intimacy made it hard to maintain the real, unexciting intimacy that some staff members actually did manage to develop with their afterschool program participants, after working with them for years. The simulacrum of intimacy was much easier to project and produce on demand than the quieter, long-term understanding that some staff developed.

## USING FLOATING SIGNIFIERS

Empty, or floating signifiers are big, hefty words like “community,” “culture,” “choice,” “leadership,” “civic,” “diversity,” and “fun.” To please their multiple implicit audiences, participants had to come up with a way of talking to one another that somehow invoked all the audiences’ logics, without appearing to violate any of them. Using floating signifiers was useful in these scrambled institutional contexts because these inspiring keywords let all the diverse audiences fill in the blanks with whatever fitted their own logic’s implicit demands (Laclau, 1996).

All words are generalities, or “typifications” (Schütz, 1967). They all prevent thought in some ways, by shining a bright beam on one object of focus so that people can collectively ignore what doesn’t need attention at the moment, and attend to what does (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Still, some words do more work as floating signifiers than others. Big, freighted keywords are useful precisely *because* they can smuggle so many contradictory meanings into speech. Being so empty, they can bring people together, *as if* in agreement (Laclau, 1996).

For example, when African American speakers at one Martin Luther King day celebration kept referring to “our community,” they slid back and forth between meaning “African Americans in our city,” “African Americans across the nation,” and “everyone in our city” (see Levine’s remarkable study observing this same pattern (Levine, 2017). Doing “community talk” like this made it possible to refer to inequalities between the 400 audience members in ways that each audience could interpret through its own filters: black participants could interpret the speeches as being about uplifting the Black community, while others could hear it as a message of general unity. It became confusing when, for example, one Black speaker told the crowd that he wanted kids in our community to “get B’s,” when non-disadvantaged youth were already getting A’s (and had even tried to plan a civic project that would pressure schools to offer higher-than-A credit for some high school courses). Once, a staff person accused a public speaker using the word “choices” to cover up inequality, and sometimes, youth joked about white adults use of “diversity.” In these cases, floating signifiers often thus had the unintended consequence of highlighting inequalities.

To summarize: Using empty signifiers “worked” as a navigation technique by bringing diverse people physically together and allowed them to stay together comfortably for a short while, even when there was serious disagreement. These signifiers were in great demand from external audiences: donors demanded a catechism of clichés about community, innovation, leadership, and the rest.

What were its unintended consequences? This technique did not work when anyone had to accomplish anything concrete. It often left listeners confused about what the speaker meant. It often meant evoking, while simultaneously ignoring the “diversity” that staffs were so eager to bridge.

## SEPARATING FRONTSTAGE AND BACKSTAGE

Actors could often say and do things “backstage” (Goffman, 1959) that they could not say “frontstage.” In most social thought, the “backstage” is where

people say and do what does not fit the official story. Waiters, for example, can go in the kitchen, and make fun of customers together. The paradox in the youth programs was that the *backstage* interaction often adhered more closely to the projects' missions than the *frontstage* display. This makes sense since so many audiences' missions were hard to quantify and accomplish quickly.

For example, when adult volunteers came once a week for a few hours a week for a few months to the after-school programs to help low-income youth with homework, they said they hoped to become "like beloved aunts" to the youth they "mentored": to create what they called "a family-like atmosphere." But almost no volunteers could spare more than an hour or two a week for more than a few months; and if volunteering stopped feeling rewarding, they left. As youth participants in the afterschool programs often complained to the paid employees, these volunteers came and went too quickly to be of any help. These "plug-in volunteers" (Eliasoph, 2011) did not know the kid, the school, the teacher, or the previous assignments.

So, the plug-in volunteers often tried, instead, to have fun and forge an emotionally rewarding, "family-like" bond with the teens rather than help with their homework. Adults would do small talk as a simulacrum of authentic intimacy, or they would play – luring teens outside for a snowball fight in the road at twilight, for example.

Staffs were in an institutional bind. They needed adult volunteers, to show funders that the programs enjoyed grassroots support. So, though staff complained to each other about the harmful volunteers, they never spoke of getting rid of them. Staff never told the volunteers about the young people's complaints, either. Instead, at the end of every semester in one afterschool program, staff made teens hand-write and draw "thank you" notes to the semester's volunteers, even those who had come only twice and whose names no teens remembered. But front-stage, teens learned to thank all adult volunteers for their help.

To fulfill some of the most important missions that audiences wanted them to accomplish, actors had to hide somewhere backstage. The four most studious young people in one afterschool program would actually *hide in a basement room* so that they could get their homework done, away from the eager adult volunteers. One unintended consequence: to manage the unhelpful volunteers, afterschool program participants learned not to take adult volunteers' lavish promises of eternal devotion seriously.

To summarize, "separating frontstage and backstage" worked as a navigation technique by protecting some core missions from the unintended consequences of meeting other core missions and of the audit. When it worked, it allowed participants momentarily to stop producing documentation and an exciting public image, but to hide somewhere where they could quietly and slowly fulfill the projects' real missions.

What were the unintended consequences? First, programs appeared to be displaying their real work in public, for all to scrutinize, when in fact, the real work had to be hidden, because it was hard to explain quickly, and results came slowly, in hard to measure ways. So, using this technique could undermine the programs' ability to communicate their lessons to the greater public. Second, using this

technique encouraged cynicism about organizations' stated missions – a useful lesson, perhaps, but not on these projects' long list of missions.

### USING THE FUTURE PERFECT

Staff often invoked floating signifiers like “choices, leadership, and community” in the “future perfect,” as if the mission had already been accomplished. The way participants used them in these moments, they had the potential to become something different. With this “aspirational talk,” staff hoped to create a happily self-fulfilling prophecy, dragging reality in its wake (Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013; Eliasoph, 2015). Speaking in the future perfect described a hoped-for future as if it had already arrived.

Sometimes, it didn't work. To draw on what staff called “community assets” in a neighborhood that staff said did not have enough “community,” a non-profit tried holding “community dinners.” But parents would just send their kids with take-out containers, to fetch the food to bring home. For example, at one meeting, youth volunteers were asked when they had become “leaders,” and what are the qualities of a leader. Many said that they were not leaders, and some said that the qualities of a leader are that he is tall and handsome. Quickly, though, youth members learned not to dispute the label. Similarly, adults often congratulated all participants at civic events for having “made good choices” when some participants were there only because their parents or program leaders had forced them to attend.

Sometimes, in a long-term relationship, it worked! It worked when there was not just aspirational talk, but shared action over time. As adult staff often told each other, even though they themselves usually did all the initial planning of most civic projects, if teens just came to meetings and got a taste of volunteering, it might eventually “whet their appetites” for genuine civic engagement. One year's grant topic was hunger and homelessness, so, in September, as usual, an experience youth worker delicately planted the suggestion in teens' heads. As one staff person bluntly put it, “if it's arts, we'll get them to want to do an arts project; if it's tobacco prevention, we'll get them to think up a tobacco prevention project.” For the next two months, four teens worked on the planning, several afternoons a week, quietly supported by their afterschool program staff person. This was their third year of volunteering, under her wing. Each year, she made herself as invisible as she could, so her kids could shine. By November of this year, they had forgotten how they had developed the idea, and assumed that they themselves had developed it, on their own. Even if it had not started, it *became* their own, and they *were* proud, and it *had* “whet their appetites,” as staff had hoped.

To summarize: “Speaking in the future perfect” worked as a navigation technique, satisfying audiences by projecting an image that hit all the right notes, all the right buzzwords. But unlike the use of floating signifiers, speaking in the future perfect could lead to the intended outcome, eventually “talking feelings into existence,” when done with exceptional skill, in a long-term relationship. Then, it worked by not just *talking* the feelings into being but *walking* them into

being (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Christensen et al., 2013; Haack, Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012; Mische, 2009; Tilcsik, 2010), through shared mutual accommodation over many months or even years. When it worked, staff could make themselves seem invisible so youth could feel proud of accomplishments that they had done with tremendous coaxing from long-term staff.

What were the unintended consequences? Without the time and practical engagement, it just seemed confusing or hypocritical to participants.

## CONCLUSION

We have introduced the concept of “navigation techniques,” which we defined as ordinary actors’ everyday, continuous processes of orienting themselves amidst institutional complexity, especially in short-term projects that are subject to frequent audits. Many scholars have shown that current organizations often have multiple scripts all in play at once; our point has been to show a *way of asking* how, in such dizzying situations, people orient themselves, so they can act appropriately. We show how these navigation techniques respond to the complex tangles of demands that come from audiences’ multiple institutional logics. Further, we show that navigation techniques have fairly predictable, often unintended consequences.

The concept of navigation techniques helps clarify some key concepts in organization theory:

*Decoupling:* We hope we have made the concept of decoupling both more precise and more flexible, by showing how actors used very precise and yet varied methods for decoupling their action from the logics that their audiences demanded. To act competently, members had to learn how to invoke or ignoring different logics at different moments, and from whom to expect the different logics. Hallett (2010) suggests the term “recoupling” for a similar process, but “recoupling” sounds more settled than the process of continuously orienting oneself that we describe. Recoupling also involves aligning logics. With “navigation techniques,” there is not a settlement between logics, but people keep going anyway.

*Hybrid organizations and organizational form (Clemens, 1997):* Mastering the arts of decoupling becomes especially hard in hybrid, high speed, audited collectivities. The idea of navigation techniques shows how dilemmas between different logics do not have to be resolved in order to become routinized enough that organizations can keep hobbling along. As scrambled missions solidify, people might learn navigation techniques in one project that they then bring to another. These “styles” (Eliasoph & Lichterman, 2003; Lichterman & Eliasoph, 2014) could become widespread and recognizable enough that scholars and actors could name them. Here, we hope a historian does for these perpetually unfrozen projects what Elisabeth Clemens did for the invention of the “lobby” as a form of American civic action (Clemens, 1997): show how, over time, navigation practices start congeal into a recognizable, nameable form.

*Institutional logics:* As others have shown, putting many the logics in play at once usually means ignoring all or most of the others. We add that the explicit part of a logic can conflict with the implicit practice of it. For example, advertising the

afterschool programs' "family-like atmosphere" attracted plug-in volunteers who undermined the family-like atmosphere. As the table makes painfully clear, subjecting intimate, slow, quiet activities to the glare of public scrutiny often undermines them. Measuring them for the audit can make it hard to create them in the first place. When scholars use the concept of institutional logics, they should distinguish the explicit, public "justifications" (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006) from both interactional practices, and from the audit culture's formats of documentation.

*Temporality:* In these projects, the speedy, temporary relationships contrast dramatically with the longer-term ones. It may go without saying that time matters, but many audiences did not recognize this. Time has its own meaning, as people mutual accommodate step by step, as we saw with the long-term staff and with the volunteers whose afterschool staff person spent many afternoons helping them plan civic projects. Time is more important for some missions than others: On most grant's timetables, documenting the development of "family-like bonds" is not possible. Promoting diverse connections could have worked if staff had had long-term, intensive training in guiding thoughtful, subtle discussion of potentially explosive, potentially divisive conflicts, or in encouraging interaction between diverse youth (Carrell, 2013). However, the cost and slowness of the training would have been hard to justify quickly: a hard sell, for most audiences. It would be impossible to make all activity explicit and measurable, but what was not an explicit missions often did not happen. Basic needs were not in any audience's audit. When highlighting sexy missions like civic engagement, diversity, and lowering drop-out rates, sponsors easily forget basic material needs like food.

Finally, the idea of navigation techniques could be useful to practitioners. When designing projects like the ones described here, practitioners could make some hard choices, to avoid the unintended consequences of trying to be everything to everyone, including consequences that harm the people these projects most aimed to help: the participants themselves.

## NOTES

1. We call the external sponsors "audiences (or "sponsors"), instead of other possible names, such as "stakeholders" or "the organizational environment," because theater metaphors clarify our analytical purpose (Krause, 2016) of seeing how internal "actors" "perform" varied logics for varied "audiences."

2. We call this category "non-disadvantaged," because while they were clearly distinct from the "disadvantaged" youth, there was no name for this "non-disadvantaged" category. It was "unmarked," marked by what it was not: youth who were not in the free afterschool "prevention programs" for "at risk" youth, who were not on parole, who did not expect to fail high school, who did not live in apartments or housing projects.

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